Denver Law Review
Volume 46

Issue 2

Article 3

January 1969

Representation, Suit, and Trial in Automobile Liability Claims
H. Laurence Ross

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
H. Laurence Ross, Representation, Suit, and Trial in Automobile Liability Claims, 46 Denv. L.J. 211 (1969).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

REPRESENTATION, SUIT, AND TRIAL IN

AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY CLAIMS'
By H.

LAURENCE

Ross*

Drawing upon empirical data, interviews, and observations of
the automobile injury claims settlement process, Dr. Ross explores
the effects of representation,suit, and trial on the recovery of damages from an insurance company. These effects are explained largely
in terms of an analysis of the negotiation process which disposes
of the vast majority of claims which arise. He also delineates what
kinds of cases are most likely to be represented and most likely to
go to trial, and suggests some explanations for these findings. The
evidence supports the author's thesis, presented more thoroughly in
his forthcoming book, that the attorney's ability to negotiate settlemens skillfully is far more significantin terms of its effect on recovery than is his knowledge of the formal law.

H

OW does the claimant represented by an attorney fare, in com-

parison with the unrepresented claimant, in securing recovery
for bodily injury from an automobile liability insurance company?
Are there differences in recovery in sued and tried cases, as opposed
to cases that are merely represented?2 )What types of claims are
most likely to be represented, sued, and tried? This paper will
address these questions with empirical data drawn from a larger
study of the claims settlement process. 3
The data presented below were obtained from a sample of files
provided by a large insurance company, which shall be called Acme.
The company is reputed to be rather typical of large stock companies in its claims procedures. The files are a random sample,
numbering 2216, drawn from the closed files received by the main
office from its field offices in March and April of 1962. Preliminary analyses revealed that, as expected, there were strong relationships between the amount paid on a file and the economic loss, or
total special damages, documented in the file, and between payment
and apparent liability, as measured by the configuration of vehicles
*Professor of Sociology and Law, University of Denver College of Law.
To be published and copyrighted by the author as part of a forthcoming book;
H. Ross, SErLED OUT OF COURT (Aldine Publishing Co. in 1970).
2TIC term trial cases refers to those cases which involve the trial process for the
resolution of a claim. The term suit cases refers to claims which have been filed and
which may, but do not necessarily, involve the trial process since they may be settled
prior to the actual court proceedings. The term represented cases refers to those cases
which involve the attorney-client relationship. A represented case may be settled prior
to filing suit, settled after the filing of suit but before trial, or it may actually go to
trial.
3Supra note 1.
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in the accident. These relationships are legitimated in the formal
law, and the factors are specifically identified as conditions for
payment in Acme's training materials and rule books. Representation, on the other hand, is not treated by the formal law or by
official company policy as a factor to increase the value of a claim.
4
Juries are not to consider attorneys' fees in computing an award,
and Acme's executives declare opposition to any increment in payment in represented cases. On the other hand, many adjusters
acknowledge paying more in represented cases, and this situation
has been cited both in nonempirical commentaries and in the few
empirical studies that have been made of bodily injury claims payments.' With this contradiction in mind, the Acme files were
analyzed according to whether or not an attorney was present.
Other analyses, not reported here, concerned such matters as age,
sex, and race of the claimant, and employment status of the
defendant.
I.

REPRESENTATION AND RECOVERY

Apart from liability and damages, representation was found
to be the most important single factor accounting for payment.
Although it is formally irrelevant to the worth of a claim, and is
denied or minimized in discussion by most insurance company
executives and by many adjusters, the presence of a lawyer is nonetheless a major influence on the outcome of bodily injury claims.
A first glimpse at the effect is provided by Table 1, which
shows the average recovery of represented claimants to be from
5 to 20 times as high as that of unrepresented claimants. Although
some of this apparent advantage is spurious- related to the kind
of claims that attorneys agree to represent -the
fact remains that
at every level of damages and liability, the outcome in a represented
case is likely to be more favorable to the claimant than the outcome
in an unrepresented case. This fact is documented in Table 2, which
shows the recovery in represented and unrepresented claims with
a simultaneous control for liability and injury. The judgment concerning liability and injury was made for each case by coders, who
looked mainly at the accident configuration to determine apparent
liability, and at medical reports and statements to determine injury.
4See, Atlantic Coastline R. Co. v. Brown, 93 Ga. App. 805, 92 S.E.2d 874, 876 (1956).
Compare, 25 C.J.S. Damages § 50 (in some jurisdictions attorneys' fees may be considered in estimating the amount of damages where an award of exemplary damages
is authorized, - e.g., in cases of "gross negligence").
5
See, A. CONRAD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, JR., C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS, 181 et. seq. (1964); Franklin, Chanin &
Mark, Accidents, Money, and Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury
Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 16-20 (1961).
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Table 1. Recovery and representation.
Type of Representation

All Cases

Unrepresented
Solo attorney, non specialist
Firm attorney, non specialist
Specialist (NACCA)

Paid Cases Only

Number

Mean
Recovery

Number

1601
471
70
74

$ 254
$1499
$2226
$4815

950
390
59
70

Mean
Recovery

$ 427
$1810
$2641
$5090

Table 2. Recovery and representation with control for apparent
liability and injury.
Liability Likely
Injury
Moderate,
Severe or

Fatal

Percent represented
Percent recovering
Unrepresented cases
Represented cases
Mean (average) recovery
in paid cases
Unrepresented
Represented
Total cases with
information available

Liability Unlikely

Injury

Minor

Injury
Moderate.
Severe or

Injury

Fatal

Minor

60%

29%

53%

20%

79%
93%

69%
92%

61%
81%

42%
62%

$

1652
$11,603

$ 329
$1438

$5769
$1655

$235
$763

94

1350

49

723

The top line of Table 2 indicates that representation is a
function of both liability and damages, but that damages are the
more important factor. When injuries are moderate, severe, or
fatal, more than half the cases are represented, even with unlikely
liability on the part of the defendant; in fact, diminished liability
reduces representation only by 7 percent. On the other hand, minor
injury even combined with likely liability is represented in only
29 percent of the cases.
Table 2 shows that in every liability-injury category the proportion of claimants recovering some award is considerably higher
when the claimants are represented. The advantage of the represented claimant in terms of chance of recovery is not eliminated
by unlikely liability. The table also shows considerable advantage
in terms of average settlement for all paid claims, in all categories
except the one embracing unlikely liability and serious injury. In
this category the median' payment still shows a difference in the
expected direction - $1125 for the represented as compared with
$500 for the unrepresented - but the mean is affected by the small
number of paid cases (14) and the presence of two extraordinary
settlements in this group: one for $61,000 and the other for $11,000.
eThe "median" payment refers to that figure exceeded by 50 percent of the payments
and in turn greater than 50 percent of the payments. The "mean" payment refers to
that figure which is the arithmetic average of all payments. Where there are very few
cases in a particular category, the "mean" figure may be distorted by unusually high
or unusually low figures.
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An additional tabulation, controlling for size of known economic loss (special damages) indicates that the average recovery
in represented cases is roughly double or triple that in unrepresented
cases, and furthermore that attorneys recover in 41 percent of cases
in which special damages are either totally absent or unknown, as
compared with 24 percent of the unrepresented claimants in this
situation.
The facts reported in this section suggest that there is some
value accorded to claims merely because of representation. This
situation is understandable, less in the light of the attorney's
knowledge of the formal law, than in the light of his negotiation
power. 7 Were knowledge of formal law the cue to the attorney's
advantage, one might expect the advantage to weaken proportionately as the case became weaker in formal law; but the facts are
that the represented claimant has as great an advantage over the
unrepresented claimant in cases where liability is weak and injury
is insignificant as in cases where liability is clear and injury is
significant. On the other hand, negotiation power is present throughout the range of liability and injury combinations. The attorney, as
compared with the unrepresented claimant, understands the rules
of negotiation; he knows that payment will be made on a danger
or nuisance value basis in nearly any bona fide claim, providing the
insurance company believes that the claim will be pressed, and the
attorney can threaten to take any claim to court. He may also
credibly threaten to accumulate testimony favorable to liability and
to accentuate the extent of any injury. Moreover, an attorney in
accepting a case, has the advantage of a tacit commitment: both he
and the insurance adjuster know that his (the attorney's) business
and reputation would be threatened by a trivial settlement or a
denial. This knowledge lends additional credibility to the attorney's
threats, and makes these threats and rationalizations more effective
tools in securing a higher settlement for almost any given claim.
To this point I have been concerned with the effects of representation on recovery. To continue, I would like to consider some
prior correlates or causes of representation. Table 2 and Table 4
below suggest a correlation of representation with size of loss or
injury. Although part of this correlation may be explained as
manipulation of the facts concerning a given claim by the attorney,
Negotiation power will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of SETTLED OUT
OF COURT, supra note 1. The principal techniques or "plays"

in the negotiation

1game" are: proposals, which serve as a cue to the expectations of each side;
rationalizations, which legitimate proposals in terms of agreed general principles;
threats and promises, stating consequences of particular choices; and commitments,
which bind a party more convincingly to his proposals, rationalizations, and threats.
Negotiation power refers to the ability to use these techniques in a sophisticated
and successful fashion. See, CARL M. STEVENS, STRATEGY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAININC; NEGOTIATION

(1963).
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I believe that the bulk of the association is due to the inclination
of claimants with higher losses to seek representation, and to the
greater willingness of attorneys to accept claims with larger losses
and thus potentially larger recoveries.
Representation is also shown, in Table 2, to be greater when
liability is likely, although this relationship is smaller than with
degree of injury. The Acme files show lawyers accepting some
proportion of claims even when liability is most doubtful, but the
proportion here is small. Where claims with unlikely liability are
accepted by lawyers, the results are generally more favorable than
in similar unrepresented claims, again indicating the existence of
bargaining power unavailable to the unrepresented claimant.
Two additional relationships with representation can be shown
with other data. Table 3 shows the relationship between representation and recovery controlling for size of city, and shows clearly
that representation is strongly related to the urbanization of the
jurisdiction. The proportion of claims represented in the large
central cities is double that in small cities or in the countryside, and
this in turn can probably be explained by the relative sophistication
and wariness of the city-dwellers. On the other hand, the proportion
of claimants that recover does not fluctuate much in this instance,
and the average settlement in represented paid cases actually declines
with increasing urbanization. This apparent paradox is most likely
explained by the inclusion of larger numbers of small cases and
cases of tenuous liability in the total mix accepted by the urban
lawyers. The small town and country lawyers probably deal with
a more selected group of cases. The higher payments on unrepresented claims in the more urbanized jurisdictions are in accord with
general expectations concerning the effect of city size on claims;
however, the effect is not as drastic or as uniform as one might
have thought prior to viewing the data.
Table 3. Recovery and representation with control for size of city.
SMSA* More Than 1 Mill
Central

Ring

City Size
SMSA
Less Than
1 Million

Other
Urban

Rural

Percent represented

38%

33%

21%

16%

19%

Percent recovering
Unrepresented
Represented
Mean recovery in

61%
81%

58%
90%

60%
87%

58%
90%

57%
85%

paid cases

Unrepresented

$ 576

$ 344

$ 405

$ 386

9 326

Represented

$1422

$2452

$2609

$4891

$2697

698

383

576

268

136

Total cases with
information available

*Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
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Finally, representation is related to the type of claimant, in
particular to whether the claimant is Jewish or Gentile, as measured
by surname. Claimants with Jewish names were found far more
likely to be represented than others (59 percent as opposed to
26 percent for other whites). The probability of their receiving
any award, however, was somewhat lower (77 percent as opposed
to 84 percent, respectively). The explanation for the lower recovery
of represented Jewish claimants is probably identical to that for the
relationship with urbanization- the larger number of Jewish
claims represented must have included some less meritorious claims.
No differences were found in representation by age or sex of the
claimant, and an attempt to investigate race was abandoned because
of the unsatisfactory state of the data concerning Negroes.
In sum, representation is unequally distributed in the population
of claims: large claims, claims with apparent liability, claims of
metropolitan residents, and claims of Jews are instances of categories
where representation is relatively high. Although groups with high
proportions of represented cases may experience a somewhat smaller
proportion of paid claims, the level of payments in represented
claims is considerably higher than in unrepresented claims, regardless
of the fact that the official policy of the company and the formal
law are both to the contrary.
II.

NEGOTIATION,

SUIT, TRIAL, AND RECOVERY

As far as the actual negotiation of claims is concerned, the
meaning of filing suit is ambiguous. On its face, this act may be
seen as a sign of incipient failure of the negotiation: the attorney
for the claimant prepares for an expected trial. Another interpretation is that filing suit is a move in the game of negotiation: it
establishes the credibility of a threat to go to trial, but relies on a
long delay between the filing of suit and the setting of trial to
produce a negotiated settlement. This interpretation seems to me
most satisfactory for the bulk of suit cases observed. The filing
of suit may also be required to preserve the legal basis for the claim,
and thus to continue negotiation when the statute of limitations
threatens to bar the claim. Finally, it is the practice of some
attorneys, particularly in urban areas with long delays in trial
calendars, to file suit as a routine matter, regardless of their confidence that a settlement will take place. The latter procedure is also
reputed to be encouraged by contingent fee agreements that provide
a higher share for the attorney in sued cases.
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The bringing of a case to trial is a less ambiguous indication of
failure of negotiation. Even though many cases brought to trial may
settle during the course of trial, major processing costs are assumed
by both parties. Since a principal benefit of the negotiated settlement is the mutual avoidance of these costs, a conclusion of at least
partial failure of negotiation is unavoidable. In this section data
will be presented concerning recovery in tried cases as compared
with those settled prior to trial, and reasons will be suggested as
to why these failed to be settled out of court. There were too few
cases brought to trial to make distinctions among them, and these
cases will be treated together with those cases that settled during
trial (23 percent), and those that went to verdict (72 percent), and
those that were appealed (5 percent).
Table 4 presents a summary picture of proportions of cases
entering the successively more advanced stages of the legal process,
and indicates the recoveries in each stage.' The columns control
for known economic loss. The table shows first, that except where
special damages were nil, or unknown, there was recovery in more
than 90 percent of the total cases. Reading down the table we find
that the proportion of claimants recovering decreases with every
advance towards trial, from representation to suit to trial itself.
With the minor exception of a tie in the first column, this finding
holds in every category of damages. In apparent opposition to this
finding, the average recovery of those who receive anything increases
with representation and suit. This increase does not, however, continue to include the step of trial. Although the number of cases on
which the trial figure is based is very small, the fact that a decrease
is observed in three of the five categories marks this step as a
distinct departure from the observed trend.
Reading across the table, the proportion recovering at different
levels of damages is quite low where damages are nil, and fairly
uniformly high in all other categories, whether one speaks of total
cases, represented cases, or sued cases. In marked contrast, tried
cases show a rather steady increase in proportion of recovery, from
extremes of 15 percent where damages are nil or unknown to
71 percent where they exceed $500. A similar steady increase is
seen in the proportion of cases reaching successive stages in the
legal process, as damages increase.
8 Supra note 2.

218

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 46

Table 4. Recovery according to representation, suit and trial, controlling for damages.
Special Damages

0
or Unknown

Total casesPercent recovering

867
25%

$1 -$50

395
92%

$51 -$200

450
92%

$201 - $500

$5004+

258
91%

246
95%

Mean payment, paid
cases
Represented cases Percent of total
Percent recovering

$ 87
75
8.7%
41%

$123
67
17.0%
90%

$374
186
41.3%
90%

$ 911
135
52.3%
89%

$4453
152
61.8%
93%

$247
40

$546
104

$1166
72

$5916
122

Mean payment, paid
cases
Suit cases-

$579
39

Percent of total

4.5%

10.1%

23.1%

27.9%

49.6%

Percent recovering

41%

83%

85%

85%

90%

Mean payment, paid
cases

Trial cases Percent of total
Percent recovering
Mean payment, paid
cases

$632

13
1.5%
15%
$1172

$265

6
1.5%
17%
$8.00*

$564

20
4.4%
35%
$449

$1258

20
7.8%
55%
$1289

$6736

34
13.5%
71%
$4655

*Based on fewer than 10 cases.

Support is given to the established generalization that large
cases go to trial more frequently. Tried cases are nevertheless a
distinct minority of the large cases, and there must be something
special about them.
Even disregarding processing costs, trial does not seem to yield
systematically larger net recoveries than representation alone. With
respect to the proportion of claimants recovering, it is considerably
worse.
These findings do not appear to be explainable by simple
principles other than tautological statements such as: cases which
go to trial are those that could not be settled, or are those on which
agreement as to evaluation was impossible. However, I am willing
to speculate concerning these findings, basing my thoughts on my
interviews and observations.
A first factor that may result in trial is the presence of zero
special damages per se.9 A claimant without medical bills or lost
wages has very little with which to interest an insurance company,
other than his signature. The latter alone is worth something, i.e.,
nuisance value, but the amount that an adjuster can pay in that
category is too small to buy off a represented case. Many of these
cases may verge on the fraudulent, or at best represent noncom9 Where damages are nil or unknown, a high proportion of represented and sued cases
go to trial. This finding may be partly an artifact of the data: claims denied early
in their history may produce a file without any indication as to damages, although
serious injury may have been involved along with very doubtful liability. The
following discussion assumes that, allowing for this artifact, there remains some
overrepresentation of zero damages cases among all tried cases.
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pensable damages to dignity. Others may involve a genuine hurt,
but injuries in the absence of bills do not impress the bureaucratic
supervisory structure within which an adjuster works. It will be
noted that few of these cases are represented, but an attorney
accepting a case makes a tacit promise to secure more than nuisance
value, and this frequently sends him to the courtroom. The wisdom
of the companies in opposing this type of claim is borne out by the
low proportion of recoveries in this category, yet the relationship
between the attorney and his client may make trials of these cases
inevitable.
A different situation may be involved in many claims with
high special damages. Very serious claims are supervised not only
at the local level, but also at the regional or even home office levels
of a company. It is not only the adjuster who has to justify his
evaluation to a supervisor, but the supervisor in turn must justify
a joint evaluation to one or more higher executives. The understandable tendency in this situation is to be very conservative in
evaluation. Moreover, where much is at stake, assumption of
processing costs inherent in trial is easier, because these costs become
trivial compared to the potential verdict. Trial in this case may
serve a bureaucratic function. A supervisor may recriminate with
his subordinate if he disagrees with the reasonableness of the latter's
negotiated settlement. He cannot disagree with a subordinate's
payment of a judgment ordered by a court. In this situation, trial
may be a way of preserving the bureaucratic structure of the
insurance company. Support for this interpretation comes from the
fact that a relatively high proportion of tried cases in the highest
bracket of damages do recover, and with an average payment
higher than the figure for total cases, albeit the figure is lower
than that for represented cases as a whole.
Another principle can be deduced from Table 5, which introduces the simultaneous control for injury and liability. It is seen
in this table that trial is more related to injury than to liability;
in fact, more cases weak than strong on liability are tried. Resistance
to cases of weak liability might reasonably be expected from the
companies, but why should lawyers press these cases? The answer
may be related to the type of gamble offered by these cases of weak
liability. It is precisely where liability is weak and injury is moderate
or severe that the highest proportion of cases go to trial. It is in
these cases that the danger value rule' operates, and the adjuster
10 In cases with liability unfavorable to the claimant, but with bad injury, Acme's policy
is to permit local offices to offer somewhere in the neighborhood of ten percent of
"full value" as a compromise payment. This is termed danger value, the reference
being to the possibility of a high award if the case manages to get to a jury despite
apparent nonliability.
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is legitimately able to offer compromise payments. However, the
offers in these circumstances may appear trivial both in the light
of expenses borne by the claimant and in the light of possible
recovery if the liability barrier can be passed. Heavy expenses on
the part of the claimant mean that a considerable sum must be
offered merely to pay existing bills and the attorney's fees. In the
extreme, as in one case observed, if no payment is forthcoming the
bills will simply go unpaid. The case in question involved a woman
of 60 whose income was $30 per week and whose life savings were
$900. Her medical bills exceeded $4,000. This woman would be
no better off personally with a settlement for medical expenses than
with no settlement at all. For this reason, the adjuster declined to
make any offer. In contrast, even with one chance in 10 of getting
to a jury in such a case, it might be worthwhile to the lawyer to
press for trial, since at least one significant recovery might be
expected in the course of many trials.
Table 5. Recovery in tried and untried cases, controlling for liability
and injury.
Liability Favorable
to Claimant

Percent tried

Percent recovering
Untried cases
Tried cases

Liability Unfavorable
to Claimant

Injury
Mo(, or Ser.
(N-94)

Injury
Minor
(N-1333)

12.8 %

3.0%

Injury
Mod. or Ser.
(N-49)

Injury
Minor
(N-716)

16.3%

4.6%

88%

76%

78%

47%

88%

63%

38%*

21%

Mean recovery in

paid cases
Untried cases
Tried cases

$ 7288
$12,847*

$ 660
$2990

$3565
$ 483*

$380
$521"

*Based on fewer than ten cases.

A final principle, relevant to the whole range of cases, may be
deduced from the example in Table 6. Where the case is complicated, trial may be necessary because the negotiation task becomes
too complex. The example here is additional defendants, as would
result, for instance, from a multiple-car collision. In this instance,
agreement as to liability and damages is required from a larger
number of parties. Over four times as many cases go to trial where
there is more than one defendant. Whether tried or untried, claims
in which there is more than one defendant are paid much less often,
doubtless because Acme's insured is sometimes only peripherally
involved.
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Table 6. Trial, recovery and multiple defendants.
Number of Defendants

Percent tried
Percent recovering
Untried cases
Tried cases

One Only (N-1648)

More Than One (N-544)

2.6%

10.6%

74%
86%

48%
25%

SUMMARY

This research has confirmed the generalization that big cases
go to trial, which I believe to have been the only generalization of
this nature to have appeared in the academic literature. However,
inspection of the Acme files shows that even among cases with large
losses only a small proportion goes to trial, and among those cases
with negligible losses a surprisingly large proportion is tried. A
closer look at the data suggests some additional principles accounting
for trial; trial may occur disproportionately in cases which, lacking
bureaucratically acceptable accounts, cannot justify a significant offer
from the bureaucracy. It occurs in cases where the stakes are so
high as to make processing costs inconsiderable, and in these cases
it helps to protect the supervisory structure of the company bureaucracy. It occurs where it presents a long-shot chance of a very high
judgment as a choice counter to a very low settlement, in which
case the utility of the small sum would seem to be negligible. Finally,
it occurs in cases that are more complex, involving difficult fact
situations or numerous negotiators, where agreement on a definitive
allocation of costs and responsibilities is harder to obtain.

